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TAX HARMONIZATION AND COORDINATION IN
EUROPE AND AMERICA
by Stephen G. Utz*
I. INTRODUCTION
The countries of northern and western Europe and North America
share a common tax policy tradition. It arose in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, a period of intense interest in free trade,' of allegiance to the politi-
cal importance of nationality,' and of secular reverence for the state.3
Not surprisingly, early nineteenth-century arguments for laissez-faire trade
policy and for the replacement of excise and customs taxes with direct
taxes - all based on the earliest economic models of national economic
systems - took for granted that nations were the natural economic units
and that they affected each other in limited ways at best. These models,
and views about taxation based on them, have now begun to seem inade-
quate.
The general view today is that national tax regimes need to take
global economic integration into account. In Europe this naturally be-
comes part of the project of the European Union (EU), the completion of
the European Communities. The members of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (the OECD), which include all EU
member states as well as Canada, Japan and the United States, exchange
information and sponsor studies that are intended to assist them in reach-
* Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Professor Utz would like
to thank the panelists on the Taxation panel for comments on a draft of this paper. Professor Sijbren
Cnossen generously reviewed a semifinal draft and made many helpful comments.
1. See DENIS PATRICK O'BRIEN, THE CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS (1975); CARL S. SHOUP,
RICARDO ON TAXATION (1960); STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF
THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 1-10 (1993).
2. E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY
(1990).
3. PHYLLIS DEANE, THE STATE AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HIS-
TORY OF POLmCAL ECONOMY 51-71 (1979).
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ing consensus on commercial and related tax matters. The North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rests upon pre-existing coordination
of taxation among Canada, Mexico and the United States, whose econom-
ic activities have long been broadly intertwined." The Pacific Rim coun-
tries are seriously pursuing options that may emulate those of the EU and
the NAFTA, though it is too early to tell what the outcome will be. In the
United States, growing state tax burdens and their suspected effect on the
''rolling recession" that afflicts now one region and then another within
the country, have prompted a greater sense of the need for tax neutrality
among states - a need made all the more poignant by the veritable jun-
gle of different state tax regimes. Although the problems and interests of
the international community and of federal states differ enormously, they
now find they have a common policy framework for the discussion, if not
solution, of fiscal problems.
The elements of the new framework are shaped by the concepts and
strategies implicit in existing tax systems. These systems have of course
not been able to ignore the international dimension of taxation. Tax trea-
ties, unilateral measures against tax opportunism, and tax measures de-
signed to provide reasonable allocation of the profits of multi-national
firms are among the already well-established responses. But the goal of
greater, more deliberate cooperation to neutralize the interaction of differ-
ent tax regimes has come to the fore; in particular, most experts and
many governments consider coordination of taxes on income from capital
a priority.5
This paper describes the problems of tax design that arise because of
global economic integration, examines the means already developed for
dealing with these problems, including the chaotic federal approach to
taxation that is characteristic of the United States, and looks ahead to new
but as yet untried solutions, especially those pioneered by the European
Union. Part II provides a brief explanation of the effect of global eco-
nomic integration on the structure and efficacy of nationally based tax
systems. Part III offers an account of the source of problems, both in
principle and in practical application, that international tax policy faces.
Part IV then discusses the mechanics of international taxation insofar as
4. Paul R. McDaniel, NAFTA and Formulary Apportionment: An Exploration of Issues, in
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 293 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees van Raad eds., 1993).
5. Coordination of commodity taxation hardly seems necessary, because the destination prin-
ciple, which ensures tax neutrality among different taxing regimes, and the tax entitlement rule
coincide. For income taxes, tax neutrality requires the application of the residence principle, but the
tax entitlement rule points to the source principle. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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they bear on the problems of harmonization and coordination. Part V
considers the significance of the goal of tax neutrality and its relationship
with the theoretical concept of economic distortions. Part VI reviews EU
efforts to achieve tax neutrality.
II. GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND TAX POLICY
Until recently, discussions of tax theory usually assumed that a tax-
ing sovereign could afford to concern itself almost exclusively with the
economic conduct of its own citizens.6 Reality, however, has not been
kind to this premise. Interconnecting markets for goods and services,
improved communications, an emerging world market for capital, laws
that permit and foster transnational enterprises, and other now familiar
trends toward globalization have rendered the idea of autarkic economic
systems obsolete. The closed economic system was only a theoretical
construct, but for tax theory its obsolescence has been very disorienting.
Some rejected corollaries of the "closed economy" assumption are
worth noting. It was once commonly said that, under ideal conditions and
in the short term, taxing and governmental borrowing are economically
equivalent strategies.7 Now we are much more often concerned with the
interaction of taxes and public debt. The size of a country's debt as a
percentage of gross domestic product is a closely-watched index of the
strength or weakness of the national economy. The relationship of this
index to the country's "tax effort" - the ratio of its tax revenues to the
gross domestic product - is of practical interest not only to central bank-
ers and currency traders but to ordinary investors and entrepreneurs as
well.8 The reason for the concern is that international economic measures
now dramatically vary the real value of a country's debt and annual tax
receipts, which in turn affect the strength of currencies and the risk asso-
ciated with investment in government obligations.
This trenches upon another over-simplification of traditional tax
6. See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, The Role of Corporate Taxes in an Open Economy, NBER Rptr.
10 (Spring 1994) ("Until recently ... almost all [work on corporate taxes and their role in the tax
structure] has assumed that the economy is closed."). In practice, of course, the designers and admin-
istrators of tax systems recognized the oversimplification implicit in closed economy theorizing. That
did not prevent them from continuing to attach priority to the assumptions and conclusions of the tra-
ditional viewpoint.
7. Admittedly, it has been a while since economists tried seriously to make anything of this
idea. But see CHARLES M. ALLAN, THE THEORY OF TAXATION 23 (1971).
8. See B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 29-35 (1991); RICHARD ROSE &
TERRANCE KERRAN, TAXATION BY INERTIA (1987).
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theory: the integration of the world economy undercuts the hitherto com-
mon assumption that domestic saving and domestic investment are equiv-
alent. What is saved in one country can now quite easily elude that
country's commercial borrowers through a variety of overseas investment
vehicles. Taxed enterprises can go abroad, and money made scarce
through government borrowing can distort the domestic tax base, which
for political reasons is ordinarily not indexed for fluctuation in the value
of the currency. Thus, through taxpayer reaction, the effect of any deci-
sion to finance governmental functions through taxes rather than debt or
vice versa becomes so ramified as to be uncertain even in broad outline.
The non-separateness of national economic systems upsets traditional
tax theory in another important respect. We now routinely doubt the
relevance of economic models of national tax systems, to the extent that
they treat cross-border transactions as if they were not affected by the
character of the national tax system.9 We now assume that the effect of
domestic taxes on international business is not independent of competitive
conditions in other countries and taxes on business done abroad, and
models must accordingly be transnational.
Conditions that foster tax competition are also part of this more
global perspective in tax theory. By "tax competition" I mean both the
deliberate attempt by a taxing sovereign to offer tax advantages to mobile
taxpayers in order to attract them to its jurisdiction, and the unintended
creation of such attractions. Examples of deliberate tax competition are
few among the more advanced industrial democracies. Such sovereigns
can rarely achieve overall economic gains by flaunting the interests of
their many trading partners, as they must do in most cases to compete
openly with other states by offering tax advantages to investors and firms.
But examples of apparently unintended or indirect tax competition are
abundant.
Consider the case of the United States in the early 1980s. On taking
office, the Reagan administration immediately proposed and won legisla-
tive approval for what was called "safe harbor leasing." A safe harbor
lease was in effect a transfer of tax losses from one U.S. corporation to
another, and by approving such leases the U.S. tax code authorized the
virtual elimination of the corporate tax - so many losses were available
9. See M. Boskin & W. Gale, New Results On the Effects of Tax Policy on the International
Location of Investment, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 201 (Martin
Feldstein ed., 1987); Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, Domestic Saving and International Capital
Flows, 90 ECON. J. 314 (1980); Hans-Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Cost of Capital: The "Old"
View, the "New" View, and Another View, 5 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 25 (1991).
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in corporate solution for other corporations to buy, that soon no corpora-
tion had net income for tax purposes." This thinly veiled repeal of the
corporation-level tax, along with relatively generous withholding provi-
sions in U.S. tax treaties with a number of its more prosperous trading
partners drew a huge flow of foreign direct investment to the U.S. private
sector." The U.S. temporarily became a tax haven. Needless to say, the
proponents of safe harbor leasing did not call attention to its tax competi-
tive effect on the world capital market. The ostensible purpose was to
stimulate the U.S. economy by reducing the corporate tax burden. Pre-
sumably, in the world of diplomacy, it does make some difference that
this domestic political goal could be cited in justification for what was in
fact a tax competitive measure. But there is no a priori difference in eco-
nomic effect between seemingly unintended tax competition and tax com-
petition that is blatantly intended as such. Hence, my use of the term to
cover both.
Tax competition as such is neither good nor bad. 2 It can conceiv-
ably eliminate economic distortions due to national tax laws but it can
also undermine legitimate goals of supporting government and stabilizing
or stimulating domestic economic activity. Whatever its consequences, tax
competition is not under government control. The alternative is the con-
scious mutual adjustment of tax systems to eliminate differences that
might make one tax jurisdiction more attractive than another as a place
for investment or business activity. If the tax laws of all countries were
harmonized, i.e., had similar effect on commercial and investment deci-
sions, tax competition would obviously be avoided. Assuming that the
absence of economic distortions due to taxation would assure a general
gain in wealth or welfare, tax harmony would clearly be a good thing.
Something less than complete harmonization might be sufficient, though;
10. See CATHIE MARTIN, SHIFTING THE BURDEN (1991).
11. Not that foreign investors sought to invest in U.S. corporations that had substantial losses,
but the possibility of shelter corporate income from the U.S. corporation tax made the United States a
tax haven, by enabling corporations to enjoy a negative tax rate, i.e., to obtain refunds of taxes paid
in previous years. The phenomenon of increased FDI in the United States during the early Reagan
years has been noted generally, although it is sometimes attributed exclusively to the generous depre-
ciation schedules and investment tax credits of the 1981 U.S. tax legislation. See A. Lans Bovenberg
et al, Tax Incentives and International Capital Flows: The Case of the United States and Japan, in
TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 283, 303-03 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
12. See Sijbren Cnossen, More Tax Competition in the European Community?, in Public Fi-
nance, Trade, and Development, Proceedings of the 44th Congress of the International Institute of
Public Finance 153 (1990) (arguing that more competition rather than less would be good for the
European Community).
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
"tax coordination" is the term often applied to more selective mutual
adjustment of potential competitive tax systems. The paradigm of tax
coordination is the bilateral tax treaty.
III. SOURCES OF PROBLEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL TAx POLICY
Most states claim full taxing authority over people, property and
transactions "within" their territory. If the people, property, and economic
transactions of different countries could be kept separate - if national
economic systems and national tax jurisdictions were closed to each other
in relevant respects - jurisdictional rules would dictate more or less
straightforward principles for coordinating different countries' tax sys-
tems. But while it is easy to determine whether a human being is in or
out of a country, it is not always easy to determine the situs of property
or transactions for tax purposes. Most national economic spheres, unlike
national borders, are fairly open, and not only to the free movement of
things and services, but open too in the sense that some things and events
have no clear place within or beyond any territorial boundary. Issues of
line-drawing and issues concerning the effect of taxes on the mobility of
capital are not surprisingly the two main areas into which discussion of
international tax policy falls.
These issues have obvious equity and efficiency dimensions. Indeed,
all line-drawing for tax purposes is essentially directed toward achieving
equity, usually equity among residents of the taxing country and its treaty
partners. And efficiency, in the form of various conceptions of what is
good for domestic and supra-national capital markets, seems to prompt
tax laws designed to control out-bound or in-bound investment.
If the classical economic tradition slighted the interaction of national
economies, heirs to that tradition also had little to say about it until fairly
recently. The most respected analytical successes of the classical and neo-
classical traditions in economics merely reinforced the tendency of econo-
mists and those they advised to think in terms of closed economic sys-
tems. Now, even simple questions about how taxes affect investment
within a country can require answers to novel, and by their nature com-
plex, non-tax economic questions.
Something else complicates the task of designing tax measures that
will take the international context into account. People do not generally
agree on principles that might define good or even acceptable behavior
from an international perspective. What consensus about international
morality and good politics there is can scarcely support discussion of the
fair play and affirmative desirability of tax measures that affect many
[Vol. 9:767
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Tax administrators regard the accounting problems raised by multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) as another problem. The most notorious of
these problems concerns transfer pricing- the pricing of goods and ser-
vices in transactions between members of the same corporate group. Since
the parties to these intra-group transactions do not act at arm's length,
they may be suspected of pricing goods and services so as to minimize
income or maximize deductions in high-tax jurisdictions, when the
transaction involves corporations in different jurisdictions.
Finally, legislative tax policy officials and tax administrators may
consider the goal of harmonizing or coordinating their respective tax
systems with those of common market treaty partners as responsive to yet
another sort of problem. Indeed, from the standpoint of implementing a
rational and effective national tax system, these are more or less distinct
problem areas. It is easy to see, however, why some countries think the
problems are connected. 6 The purpose of double tax treaties is to coor-
dinate the taxes imposed by the treaty partners on various aspects of the
economic lives of their citizens. If an individual citizen of one treaty
partner resides in the other treaty partner's jurisdiction, coordination may
be achieved by exempting that citizen from the usual tax claims of the
host country. The same is true for a business formed under the auspices
of one treaty partner and doing business only in the other's territory.
Often, however, business entities are active both at home and abroad.
When treaty partners have overlapping jurisdiction over a firm that is the
creature of one of them, the immediate effect of a double tax treaty is to
and perhaps others, appear to be particularly concerned to thwart tax competition that results from the
opportunism of private firms that detect weaknesses in the formulation of the anti-discrimination
clauses themselves. See Richard L. Doemberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: The
Branch Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173 (1989); Richard G.
Minor, Germany, 8 TAX NoTES INT'L 76 (1994) (discussing the German Anti-Abuse and Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, passed on December 17, 1993, which includes anti-treaty-shopping provi-
sions).
16. The United States embarked several years ago on a campaign to rid the world of treaty-shop-
ping, at least if the treaty-shopping took advantage of a U.S. treaty. A host of recent U.S. treaty revi-
sions give a conspicuous place to the limitation of treaty benefits to individuals and firms that can
claim a substantial nexus with the treaty partner. See Tax Notes International stories concerning late
1993 treaty hearings for a discussion of same. Recently, Germany has adopted an anti-treaty shopping
statute that may herald a similar renegotiation of its tax treaties. See Richard G. Minor, Overview of
New German Anti-Abuse and Technical Corrections Act, 93 TAX NoTEs INT'L 243-47 (1993). Other
countries remain skeptical if generally conciliatory towards the goal of eradicating treaty-shopping.
Leif Muten, Inspiration or Desperation - European Reactions to US Tax Thinking, in ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: To SIDNEY I. ROBERTS 311-13 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees van Raad eds.,
1993).
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allocate taxing jurisdiction between them. One treaty partner is entitled to
tax certain transactions, involving specified nationals of the two treaty
partners, and the other is entitled to tax other transactions, involving
specified nationals. Hence, it is sometimes said that the main purpose of
double tax treaties is to resolve conflicts of taxing jurisdiction. 7
The notional contrast between problems of jurisdiction and problems
of economic distortion due to tax competition can be misleading. It is
sometimes important to resolve rivalry among taxing authorities in order
to avoid other problems, including deliberate tax competition. States
whose tax jurisdictions do not overlap may find incentives to engage in
tax competition. Therefore, it may be tempting to suppose that the task of
the double tax treaty is to de-fuse a diplomatically troubling situation
before tax competition begins. I want to explain why friction related to
overlapping tax jurisdiction may already be tax competition and is dan-
gerous not only because it may lead the states affected to initiate tax
competition in reaction to that friction.
The mobility of business vehicles figures large in the problem. Cor-
porations and their like enjoy the ability to create and abandon jurisdic-
tional ties virtually at will, without regard to the encumbrances of em-
ployment and residence that prevent individuals from easily changing
their nationality. Lower tax rates and convenient peculiarities of the tax
structure may provide tax motives for choosing to locate in one tax juris-
diction rather than another. But the availability of a treaty between the
jurisdiction of choice and another jurisdiction may provide just as strong
a motive. As international tax advisors are too well aware, picking the
most advantageous place in which to form a corporation or other entity is
sometimes precisely a question of ascertaining how treaties will permit
the entities of that jurisdiction to pay lower taxes in a treaty partner's
jurisdiction. The phrase "treaty shopping" was coined to describe this
phenomenon. "S
17. See, e.g., J.A. KAY & M.A. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 206 (5th ed. 1990); PAUL R.
MCDANEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 173 (3d
ed. 1989).
18. Perhaps the example that most influenced U.S. thinking about the phenomenon of treaty-
shopping was the so-called "Dutch sandwich," an investment structure that made opportunistic use of
the Netherlands' treatment of dividends received by a Netherlands company from a Netherlands Antil-
les company. Under this scheme, U.S. royalties flow tax-free to an Antilles company (because the
U.S.-Netherlands Antilles treaty exempts such royalties from withholdings of tax by the U.S. payor),
are paid as dividends to a Netherlands company (which again is free from tax under Netherlands
Antilles law and Netherlands law), and then are returned to a second Antilles company, from which
the amounts can be distributed with only a nominal tax to foreign shareholders.
[Vol. 9:767
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Those of us, however, who are primarily concerned with tax policy
should not lose sight of the distinct influence of non-tax considerations on
choice of jurisdiction for the siting of corporations. Corporate managers
are at least as impressed by the procedural advantages and disadvantages
of different countries' legislation, where the governance of internal corpo-
rate affairs are concerned. Shareholders' voting rights, shareholders' right
to inspect the company books, minimum capital requirements, the defini-
tion of matters requiring shareholder approval, the requirement in some
countries of employee representation in management, and other aspects of
company law are scarcely uniform even among countries with such close
ties as those of Europe or North America. Long before the current climate
of interest in the coordination of EC direct taxation arose, the EC member
states struggled long to forge a moderately coherent pattern of shared
company law that would foster free migration of enterprises within Eu-
rope.19
B. Treaty-Shopping
While the domestic politics of a taxing authority often dictates harsh-
er treatment for foreigners than for its own residents, foreigners can
sometimes mobilize tax retaliation by their own (or even other) countries.
Tax treaties, often called "double tax" treaties because they are designed
in large part to prevent double taxation of the same income, grow out of
or anticipate the problems of tax evasion and inter-governmental retalia-
tion. They are deliberately more favorable to the citizens and resident
corporations of the treaty partners than to others, in order to secure coop-
eration against tax opportunism. They usually require a great deal of
rather technical negotiation because of differences between the party
states' tax systems. They are perhaps for that reason hard to amend. They
also require standing arbitral arrangements, access to which, by interna-
tional legal custom, is limited to citizens represented by state sponsors. In
view of the difficulty of negotiation and the cumbersomeness of arbitra-
tion, it is not surprising that a country's tax treaties are often out of sync
with its international tax policy for long periods of time.
Bilateral treaties are still the principal means by which states sort out
potential or current tax conflict. They are, however, no longer the only or
19. See Clark D. Smith, Note, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the
European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581 (1991).
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most powerful means. Trade pacts can easily do far more than treaties
limited to the settling of tax issues to establish the terms and conditions
on which national trading partners shall influence commerce within their
combined territories. Although it was once common for trade pacts, like
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATI', to ignore tax
aspects of national trade policy - pretending, as it were, that states did
not protect their agricultural sectors through tax subsidies that were not
traditionally considered "state aids" - no such myopia is likely in the hot
light of today's trade negotiations and agreements.
The anti-discrimination clause, a mutual promise by the treaty part-
ners to treat each other's citizens and corporations no differently than
their own for tax purposes, is in some ways the core of a double-tax
treaty.2' The members of the European Union, the members of the
OECD,2 and other advanced industrial democracies have created among
themselves a thick network of tax treaties in which anti-discrimination
provisions of various sorts are to be found. The United States has negoti-
ated an almost standard form of anti-discrimination clause, different in
many respects from United Nations model provisions, in its tax treaties
since 1980.22 Typically, the U.S. clause has the consequence that if, for
example, the United States imposes a ten percent excise tax on domesti-
cally produced heavy trucks, it may not impose a higher excise tax on
heavy trucks produced in this country by an individual citizen of a treaty
partner. It may not allow a state to collect higher death taxes from the
estate of a treaty partner's deceased citizen than would be due from the
estate of a U.S. citizen.
Eliminating discrimination against individuals who happen to be
nationals of the treaty partners is a relatively simple goal to achieve.23 It
20. See KEES VAN RAAD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW (1986).
21. Cf. Nigel Tutt, Scrivener Calls For Environment and Savings Tax Harmonization at OECD
Level, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 911 (1994) (EU Commissioner for Fiscal Policy Christiane Scriviner has
called for environmental and savings tax coordination within the OECD rather than the EU). Al-
though the GATT has lacked the means of enforcing its articles of agreement, including those which
might require tax coordination, the Uruguay Round will, if ratified, provide binding inter-nation arbi-
tration that will change all that.
22. United States Dept. of Treasury Model Income Tax Treaty, Tax Treaties (CCH) 11022 (June
16, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Model Treaty].
23. Not that the elimination of double taxation is automatic, even under double tax treaties, at
least those of the usual sort. If I am taxed heavily in the country where I earn (because it relies heavi-
ly on income taxes) and again heavily taxed in the country where I spend my earnings (because it
relies heavily on consumption taxes), I am surely taxed twice. Double tax treaties are generally de-
signed only to eliminate double taxation resulting from the imposition by two different taxing juris-
dictions of taxes on the same tax base.
(Vol. 9:767
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countries at once. There is no broad normative standard for assessing, say,
how Switzerland taxes the business activities of multinational corporations
(MNCs). It is as if we had to discuss domestic tax rules without even the
shared presumption of equal treatment of individuals.
This lack of principles is, as I have argued elsewhere, 3 due in part
to the fact that we are not very good at making moral judgments about
the behavior of groups, as distinguished from individuals; another is that
international law has traditionally taken a minimalist or agnostic attitude
towards most questions of transnational right and wrong. And the setting
in which international tax policy must be implemented does not tend to
supply answers to these questions. Differences in national standards of
living, cultural differences that affect how law is regarded, and so on are
just too great.
Social and political variety in a moral and political vacuum accounts
for the rudderless quality of much thought about international tax policy.
Those few familiar moral or political standards that arguably apply to
domestic and international relations alike, being all we have, take on what
is arguably too much significance. These include rudimentary notions of
economic efficiency and justice. Because more sensitive appraisal of how
many countries are faring at once seems impossible, economic efficiency
is often, even usually, identified with capital accumulation measured in
crude terms. Any sort of equal treatment of equals seems a decent enough
approximation of justice in this setting that is both luxuriant with relevant
factual differences and barren of shared moral standards.
IV. MECHANICS OF TRANSNATIONAL TAXATION
Countries levy and collect taxes from citizens and others, on the
basis of a network of traditional legal assumptions about sovereigns and
their authority over people within their respective territories. Treaties
sometimes refine or replace these assumptions. But neither the traditional
bedrock nor the treaty superstructure has so far been especially well suit-
ed to the transnational coordination of tax systems. Now that the distinct
economic lives of prosperous industrial countries have become very high-
ly intertwined, old principles of international jurisdiction and sovereignty
simply do not provide an adequate basis for the preservation of national
tax systems.
Thus, the EU principle of subsidiarity is a manifestly complex mech-
13. UTZ, supra note 1, at 195-97.
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anism for preserving the sovereignty of the member states while essential-
ly dictating to them on matters of national legislation; such national iden-
tity as the member states' tax systems retain is largely at the sufferance of
the community and in spite of the community's declared purposes. Com-
pare that with the volatile legal fiction of state "sovereignty" within the
United States, or what has sometimes been called the "dual sovereignty"
of the states and the federal entity. While the federal government, through
Supreme Court decisions concerning the sweep of the Commerce Clause,
has virtually claimed for itself the power to obliterate the tax and trade
initiatives of the individual states, enforced coordination is unnecessary
because of the comparatively small scale of state tax levies, when com-
pared with federal tax burdens, and because the states are strictly forbid-
den any individuality in trade matters.
A. Three Reasons For the Awkwardness of Sovereignty
If the traditional legal framework of sovereignty has proved awk-
ward, a pressing reason for this is the world-wide emergence of profound-
ly serious free-trade pacts. While it may be too early to say that the polit-
ical goal of radically national sovereignty is on the wane, the idea of
nationally self-contained economic activity is no longer appealing. The
example of the European Union has of course been mentioned. Canada,
Mexico and the United States hope to create a similar union. "Most fa-
vored nation" status, a creature of increasingly comprehensive treaties of
friendship, trade and communication, is of the highest significance to
other trading partners of the economic leaders. 4
Those who formulate tax legislation and administer it have generally
dealt with problems that flow from the globalization of formerly domestic
economic systems as distinct from other national tax issues, even though
economic integration makes the distinction increasingly artificial. For
example, the anti-discrimination clause of a double tax treaty is generally
conceived of as the means for thwarting unintended tax distortions,
whether resulting from over-taxation or from tax competition between the
treaty partners.'5
14. See Guy T. Petrillo, Free Trade Area Agreements and U.S. Trade Policy, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1281 (1986); see also Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An
Examination of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1 (1983).
15. Tax competition between otherwise friendly countries can occur in a variety of ways, some
intentional and some not, as the text at notes 10-11 supra indicates. The United States and Germany,
[Vol. 9:767
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can be decided unambiguously whether a natural person is in a country or
not, and there are comparatively stable assumptions concerning the situs
of transactions to which natural persons may be parties. The objective of
prohibiting discrimination against the corporate citizens of treaty partners,
on the other hand, is quite a problem. International law has not settled on
a single test for determining whether a corporation or similar juridical
entity is a national of (or otherwise belongs to) a given state.
In the past, anti-discrimination clauses typically left it to the law of
each treaty partner to decide which non-natural persons and associations
including non-citizens should be accorded the treaty privilege of nondis-
crimination. The want of consensus as to grounds for recognizing the
"nationality" of corporations or its equivalent provided a sufficient reason
for this reticence, at least as long as the consequences of not solving the
conceptual puzzle were not pressing.24 Times have of course changed.
The manipulation of corporate nationality or its counterpart by any other
name (nexus, sidge morale, etc.) has become a regular feature of interna-
tional business tax planning. The point of choosing carefully where to
incorporate is often if not invariably to take advantage of the disparate
benefits of tax treaties - in a word, "treaty-shopping."25
Apprehensions about treaty-shopping - that it may siphon off gov-
ernment revenues or disrupt cordial relations among treaty partners -
have begun to penalize this generous approach to the geographical situs
of corporations. Evidence that tax evasive business planning poses a
threat to international relations is found both in the United States' recent
threat to break faith with its tax treaty partners over this form of corpo-
rate tax evasion and in the indulgent response of its treaty partners to that
threat.26 Germany, though it condemned the United States' selective ab-
rogation of its treaty obligations as a means of combatting treaty-shop-
ping, has now adopted its own anti-treaty-shopping legislation.27 The
U.S. Treasury has announced its intention to escalate its fight against
treaty-shopping by revising its treatment of corporate intermediaries in
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
27 cmt. c (1965).
25. "Treaty-shopping" is a "premeditated effort to take advantage of the international tax net-
work and careful selection of the most advantageous treaty for a specific purpose." See H. David
Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 763, 766-68
(1983).
26. I.R.C. § 884 (1986); UTZ, supra note 1, at 197-205.
27. See Richard G. Minor, Overview of New German Anti-Abuse and Technical Corrections Act,
7 TAX NOTES INT'L 1539 (1993).
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international transactions."
Not everyone agrees that treaty-shopping is that much of a problem.
Some, for example, argue that opportunism of the usual sort MNCs en-
gage in is a small and not particularly demoralizing part of the price trea-
ty partners pay to assure equity as well as transparency in their exercise
of overlapping tax jurisdiction.29 It is at least worthwhile to be clear
about what the worry is that prompts United States and German concern.
Global economic integration means that much of the world today is
willy nilly a single economic community, with as much to gain from
internal regulation as consciously formed free trade areas like the Europe-
an Union and its imitators. A natural objective of an economic communi-
ty is to ensure an efficient allocation of investment resources within the
community. To avoid economic distortion, taxes on income from capital
should neither dictate nor heavily influence capital flows. Danger there-
fore lurks in investment flows that reflect not the real potential for eco-
nomic growth of some country's economy but only an overstatement of
the return on some otherwise less productive enterprise. Efficient alloca-
tion of investment resources ideally means equalizing the marginal rate of
return on investment in each country of the relevant economic communi-
ty.
30
If the tax treatment of income from capital is on a residence basis,
i.e., the tax liability of a resident of any country on a unit of investment
income is independent of the country in which the income originates, then
efficient mobility of capital has the consequence that the pre-tax interest
rate be the same in all countries (real interest rate, adjusted for differences
in money supply). It won't be the same if the pre-tax rates of return on
similar corporate enterprises depends on the country in which the enter-
prises are carried on. The structure of the applicable corporate tax is what
governs this rate of return, for our purposes. Either a classical corporate
tax - one comprising two layers of tax at whatever rates - with true
28. Lucinda Harper, 'Treaty Shopping' Is Target of IRS Crackdown, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 12,
1994, at A2.
29. Leif Muten remarks:
In the area of treaty-shopping, most Europeans again tend to see [at best a dangerous case of
fiscal] perfectionism. While few of us lost any sleep over treaty shopping abuses, we tend to
be sleepless when trying to understand what we are in for once the US-Dutch treaty sets the
pattern around the world. Was the system as broke as to need all that fixing? Indeed, was it
broke at all?
Muten, supra note 16, at 311-13.
30. Rates of return depend on the structure as well as the rate of capital taxation, which in most
cases is corporate taxation. KAY & KING, supra note 17, at 201-02.
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economic depreciation, or a cash flow corporate tax with integration will
do, if all countries concerned use the same structure in measuring the
corporate tax base. (This, by the way, is the announced goal of EC and
OECD theorists - everyone seems to agree that similarity of tax struc-
ture is in the common international interest.))
Treaty-shopping exaggerates the current variety of corporate tax
bases in the world economic community. Governments everywhere are
seeing strong proof of this, either in the flight of capital from their own
best enterprises or in the unwanted influx of de-stabilizing investment in
unworthy, already overbid markets - sometimes in both. A tax on treaty-
shopping enterprises could be designed not to punish or to raise revenue
but simply to remove distortive tax incentives for inefficient investments.
Needless to say, other political pressures work alongside whatever ideal-
ism there may be concerning the pursuit of more efficient capital markets.
People in business, the trade unions, and farmers everywhere seem to
favor transnational trade protectionism or retaliation therefor, and taxes
are often the chosen means.
If these pressures continue to influence policy-makers, the goal of
frustrating treaty-shoppers and of making corporate tax bases more close-
ly comparable from country to country will loom ever larger on the agen-
da of tax treaty negotiators - even at the expense of nondiscrimination.
Before the defects of anti-discrimination clauses were felt, the United
States had been engaged in, and had almost completed, a long series of
treaty re-negotiations, with the broad purpose of unifying its international
tax policy with respect to principal trading and investment partners. While
the effort was successful in most respects, it also underscored the awk-
wardness and delay that will inevitably attend any attempt to rationalize
international tax policy by traditional means. It also exposed the existence
of vastly different national needs and wants on opposite sides of the ne-
gotiating table, especially when the United States was seeking to limit the
tax-haven status of a smaller or Third World state.32 Thus, the legal pro-
cess is centrally affected by the lack of a genuinely international tax
policy agenda.
31. See KAY & KING, supra note 17; Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Harmonization Issues in the Euro-
pean Community, 8 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 259 (1990).
32. Paul D. Reese, United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 369 (1987).
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C. The Variety of National Attitudes Towards Tax Exploitation
Problems due to the awkwardness with which international business
transactions fit traditional legal concepts of international sovereignty and
jurisdiction crop up in a variety of ways and, given the inventiveness of
tax advisors, can be expected to continue to do so. The phenomenon of
tax havens - taxing jurisdictions whose laws invite residence and accord
a lower tax burden than do jurisdictions from which the tax haven resi-
dents are fleeing - has recently taken on a new look. Given the wealth
gap between the prosperous industrial democracies and the poorest coun-
tries of the world, there has always been a temptation for the have-not
jurisdictions to become tax havens, if possible, for ventures to be carried
on in their wealthier counterparts. Today, however, wealth and democracy
no longer coincide as unswervingly as heretofore. Prosperous countries
that do not have to raise revenue by the same comparatively passive
means adopted by democracies can serve as tax havens and tax powers at
the same time.33 Within the EU, a relevant contrast is that between capi-
tal-exporting and capital-importing countries, because the tax systems of
the two sorts of jurisdiction can naturally be expected to differ in their
treatment of dividends or interest paid by foreign corporations to domestic
recipients.
Many countries have adopted laws that deny tax preferences to or
impose heavier taxes on enterprises with tax haven residence, defining
that concept largely in terms of tax rates.' Such anti-tax-haven legisla-
33. The term "tax haven" is actually used in two ways in discussions of international tax plan-
ning. The more inclusive application of the term extends to all taxing jurisdictions that provide an ad-
vantage for individuals or businesses whose income or wealth would be taxed more heavily if they
fulfilled the requirements for residence in another jurisdiction. Thus, for example, since 1986 the
United States has been a tax haven for some corporate enterprises with European links because U.S.
marginal tax rates on corporate income have been reduced to a level below that of several European
countries. A U.S. corporation that could, for example, provide services in Great Britain without estab-
lishing itself there (in the sense defined by the relevant British tax law) would stand to pay less tax
on marginal profits than a British corporation would if it provided the same services in that country.
Sometimes "tax haven" is used more restrictively to describe those comparatively few countries
that openly foster efforts by their residents to attract tax avoiders. Tax havens in this sense are identi-
fiable by characteristics like a relatively low rate of taxation, high levels of secrecy for banking and
other financial transactions, a financial sector disproportionately large for the business operations
actually carried on in the country, well-developed communications networks, lack of currency control,
political and economic stability, liberal commercial laws, limited participation in tax treaties (because
potential treaty partners shun them), and the availability of competent lawyers and accountants to staff
tax avoidance operations. Vincent P. Belotsky, Jr., The Prevention of Abusive Tax Havens, 17 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 43 (1987).
34. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX HAVENS: MEASURES
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tion would thus apply to countries that openly assist tax avoidance
schemes as well as to those that inadvertently or in the pursuit of other
ends happen to do so. One of the elementary goals of double tax treaties
has been to eliminate the unintended use of treaty partners as tax havens.
An important element in treaty defenses against unwitting susceptibility to
the treaty partners to use as tax havens is the mutual exchange of taxpay-
er information between the relevant governments, sometimes in exchange
for financial aid.3"
D. Transfer Pricing
"Transfer pricing" is the allocation of costs, revenues, and related
items among the entities that make up a multinational enterprise. Most
countries profess adherence to an "arm's length" standard for appropriate
international transfer pricing, so that treaties should be interpreted accord-
ingly and the business affairs of MNCs regarded as subject to reclassifica-
tion if the arm's length standard is violated by treaty partner enterprises.
U.S. tax authorities, for example, take that position in support of currently
proposed transfer pricing regulations.36
The trouble with this simple view of how multinational corporate
groups ought to allocate their earnings for tax purposes is that MNCs, in
particular, are characterized by idiosyncratic exploitation of intangible
business assets - patents, know-how, customer lists, and good will in a
host of forms. Unrelated corporations rarely share intangibles in a manner
that permits clear comparison with the practice of these related entities.37
The exploitation of intangibles is often not a matter of separate contractu-
al agreement among related or unrelated parties, and when contracts do
commemorate the "transfer" of some or all the value of an intangible, the
accounting aspect of the transfer may offer no insight into the ultimate
division of profits among the parties.3"
TO PREVENT ABUSE BY TAXPAYERS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 21 (1987).
35. See Gregory P. Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20
INT'L LAW. 1209, 1235 (1986).
36. See U.S. TREASURY DEPT. & INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION
AND ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 482, at 1-3 (April 9. 1992) ("every major industrial nation accepts
the arm's-length standard as its frame of reference in transfer pricing cases").
37. This, at least, is the plausible thesis of recent scholarship on the subject. R. CAVES, MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982); ALAN SHAPIRO, MULTI-NATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL MANAGEMENT (1989); Michael Granfield, An Economic and Strategic Evaluation of the Pro-
posed 482 Regulations, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 121-31 (June 11, 1992).
38. Hugh Ault & David Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System
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The obscurity of the transfer pricing or, more accurately, the profit
allocation problem for MNCs affects all other aspects of international tax
policy that have been mentioned earlier in this article. Anti-discrimination
provisions in tax treaties are worthless if they do not take into account the
possibility that there may be no ultimate way of analyzing the profitabili-
ty of corporate groups that do business in several countries at once. If
corporations can disguise what really generates profits for them by divid-
ing aspects of their operations among corporations of different nationality
or residence for treaty purposes, then nationality or residence is irrelevant,
and the attempt to police it by subtle treaty classification is doomed to
irrelevance too. Similarly, even cooperation and mutual information ex-
change among all the countries in which an MNC does business cannot
illuminate the rights of those countries to tax the respective parts of the
enterprise, if there are no ultimate parts to begin with.
Unfortunately, the only purely diplomatic way out of this theoretical
and factual wilderness is arbitrary agreement by taxing jurisdictions to
apportion MNC profits so that suitable parts will be taxed by each juris-
diction. And since advance agreement by taxing authorities without the
cooperation of the affected corporations might also be futile, because the
taxpayers would remain free to change plans and reap profits elsewhere
or in a different manner than the governmental negotiators had foreseen,
the agreements should, if possible, include the MNCs themselves as par-
ties. The recently announced advance pricing agreement (APA) proce-
dures are a step in this direction.39 But since they involve only the tax-
payer corporations as parties, it was quickly recognized by commentators
here and abroad that APAs may provoke retaliation from other taxing
jurisdictions if they appear to overreach the "correct" economic result.
V. EcONOMIc DISTORTION AND TAX HARMONIZATION
It has always been one of the goals of tax design to minimize the
effect of taxes on private economic decisions, a goal usually described as
that of tax neutiality. Both direct and indirect taxation can fall short of
neutrality. Indirect taxation has often been thought to distort private eco-
nomic decisions unless it is very broadly based - the more universal its
application, the less substitution it can cause' - while direct taxation
and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 30-33 (Assaf Razin & Joel
Slemrod eds., 1990).
39. U.S. TREASURY DEPT. & INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 36, ch. 3.
40. See the discussion of optimal tax models and their implications for substitution effects in
Chapter 14. These considerations are sometimes collectively represented by the so-called "Ramsey
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may on some assumptions interfere less and on other assumptions inter-
fere more. Contemporary worries over the distortions caused by multi-
jurisdictional taxation have oddly enough reversed the balance of advan-
tages and disadvantages associated with direct and indirect taxation.
If tax policy rests on the assumption that the market achieves the
most efficient allocation of resources, it follows that a tax system should
not interfere with the market. A market shared by several countries, each
of which possesses the power to tax some of the same transactions or
person, complicates the goal of tax neutrality. Neutrality is all-encompass-
ing. It is not simply limited to events or persons within the territory of
single taxing authorities. In the context of an economic community, it is
not limited to relations between member states. The shared goal of neu-
trality therefore requires cooperation and mutual adjustment of tax legisla-
tive choices by the countries that would preserve, even for their own
purposes, pre-tax competitive conditions.
If indirect taxes can be made broadly applicable, their inherent sim-
plicity of administration and transparency to the persons who must pay
these taxes are advantages over at least some direct taxes. Income taxes,
in particular, though more neutral than indirect taxes on selected com-
modities or transactions (the customs and tariffs of the eighteenth century
were typically selective in this way), are notably less simple to administer
and less transparent to non-experts, the more carefully attuned they are to
the task of leaving competitive conditions unchanged.
Direct taxes pose much greater problems for enforcement in the
global context. The avid tax-avoider may be willing to sacrifice his or her
citizenship for, say, Liechtenstein citizenship in order to pay less in taxes.
Conveniently for tax policy, most people would find this form of tax
avoidance impractical. Investment income is unfortunately not linked to
the residence of the investor. Someone who cannot shelter his or her
wages can choose to invest in enterprises in a jurisdiction that does not
tax business profits as heavily as the home jurisdiction does. The internal-
ization of the market for investment capital has made this a practical
reality for even the smallest investors. Distributions and the proceeds
from the sale of corporate shares are likely to be taxed at the rates nor-
mally applicable to other income in the investor's country. But a country
rules," which say roughly that commodity taxes should be designed to reduce demand for all com-
modities in equal proportions. Frank Plumpton Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37
ECON. J. 47 (1927).
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that must import capital can easily be tempted to exempt income from
that capital from taxation at its source, thereby offering foreign investors
relief from at least one layer of taxation.
Some countries deliberately take advantage of gains by tax competi-
tion. U.S. tax law provides a tax holiday for U.S. corporations that estab-
lish business operations in Puerto Rico or another U.S. possession." Do-
mestic corporations appear to have taken relatively cynical advantage of
the possession tax credit by transferring the manufacturing aspect of a
business to a possession corporation controlled by a mainland parent.
Most of the gains from these tax competitive measures are at the expense
of the economy of other areas. In some instances at least, established
manufacturing enterprises have transferred operations from an original
location on the U.S. mainland to Puerto Rico, taking away jobs from
specific groups of workers on the mainland. Such tax-motivated geo-
graphical moves can have relatively high costs elsewhere in the economy.
Accordingly, the general welfare may be diminished if potentially
competitive taxing jurisdictions do not refrain from the practice of under-
mining one another's tax regimes. The EU has in particular agreed to
avoid the use of "state aids" for the purpose of intra-community competi-
tion and is seeking, still with little success, to persuade recalcitrant mem-
bers to bring their corporate tax systems into rough conformity. Simulta-
neously, and with greater success, the EU has by negotiation among its
members achieved a reasonable degree of uniformity in the adoption of
value-added taxes as partial surrogates for corporate taxes,42 and more
recently other members of the OECD have followed suit. Only the United
States, Switzerland, and Australia have not yet done so.
Most European countries that once had "classical" corporate tax
structures - tax systems that impose a tax on corporate profits and on
distributions out of those profits - have now moved to various forms of
dividend relief, so that corporate income is roughly taxed at rates corre-
sponding to the marginal tax rates of their shareholders (the Netherlands
is the most important exception). The imposition instead of a value-added
tax, which operates as a tax on consumption rather than on production or
profits, is considered by many economists a more neutral way to skim a
governmental share from the net product of an economy in close interac-
41. I.R.C. § 936. The provision allows a credit for that portion of the corporate tax attributable
to income from Puerto Rico or another possession of the United States, if 80% of the gross income of
the corporation came from sources in a possession for the preceding three years and 75% from the
active conduct of a trade or business for the year for which the credit is to be claimed.
42. KAY & KING, supra note 17, at 209-17.
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tion with other economies.43 EC tax theorists generally argue that such
neutrality follows from the way in which a consumption tax of this design
(not all consumption taxes would share the relevant feature) takes geogra-
phy into account.
What suits the VAT to the purpose in question is primarily the in-
voice method of collection that is generally used in Europe. (Other meth-
ods of VAT collection could achieve the same advantage only by greatly
added complexity.) The European VAT is imposed on producers as prod-
ucts are sold (services are taxed in the same way) and collected by refer-
ence to invoices filed with the tax authorities. Exports are exempted from
the tax by the simple expedient of refunding the tax to purchasers as they
cross the border (or thereafter). Importers pay tax on the full value of
imports at the VAT rate. The result is that only goods and services con-
sumed in the taxing country are in principle subject to the tax. It is said
therefore that the tax is imposed on a destination basis. By contrast, elim-
inating the special provision for imports and exports would have the
effect of taxing goods and services where they originate and not necessar-
ily where they are consumed. They would then be said to be taxed on a
source basis. What makes the VAT attractive for the purpose of frustrat-
ing tax competition is that it is both a consumption (not a production) tax
and destination based. If different countries within an integrated trading
community impose taxes at different rates on a destination or residence
basis and on the same tax base (e.g., consumption or individual, as op-
posed to corporate, income), taxes should have no effect on consumer
choices.
In contrast, flat taxes on consumption tend to be regressive with
regard to income levels and may adversely influence choices between
labor and leisure because they "favor" purchases of goods that are in
some respects substitutes for work - like camping and sports products.
The high cost of administering a European-style VAT has been widely
discussed, not always on the basis of adequate data. In Great Britain, the
cost was estimated to be as great as ten percent of revenues in the 1970's,
when the rate of the tax was relatively low (eight percent)." A part of
the cost may have been attributable to the "zero-rating" or exemption of a
variety of goods and services. More recent estimates for OECD country
43. See HANS-WERNER SINN, CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE
ALLOCATION (1989); Sijbren Cnossen, Coordination of Sales Taxes in Federal Countries and Com-
mon Markets, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 741 (1994).
44. C.T. SANDFORD ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF VAT (1981).
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administration of VAT are considerably lower, and it is possible that
estimates for both earlier and more recent periods have been too high.45
The demoralization associated with yet another layer of paperwork for
sellers may constitute a smaller portion of the total cost of VATs in Eu-
rope than would be the case in this country.
From the foregoing, it will be clear that the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Community believes tax competition to be harmful to the Commu-
nity. Whether tax competition is harmful itself, i.e., without regard to
political and commercial goals of a community that strives for identical
conditions on trade within its domain, is another matter. In the view of
public choice theorists, governments, too, are participants in something
like a market place that must compete for scarce resources. Their tax
structures are the means of their competition. Competition may restrain
them from inefficiency as producers of public goods and thereby promote
greater efficiency in the public sector.46
Those who question the basic premises of public choice theory, who,
for example, doubt the significance of speculation about the "efficiency of
governmental decisions," will no doubt find less to like about tax compe-
tition. They may suspect indeed that tax competition must result in an
aggregate welfare loss. This could follow for any number of reasons from
the basic features of tax competition: that it undermines putatively opti-
mal tax systems, that it induces untimely adjustments of tax systems, etc.
Measurement of that loss, if any, however, is not currently available.
Even if income were a safe proxy for welfare, the national incomes of
different countries cannot necessarily be added if we wish to compute the
aggregate income of a community. Several researchers have used general
equilibrium models to try to ascertain whether a beneficial tax system,
45. According to Professor Cnossen:
The ... opening costs of the VAT ... can be overestimated. In estimating administrative
costs, for instance, the 1993 report of the U.S. General Accoutning Office (GAO) seems to
place too much emphasis on a high audit presence and the subsequent study of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on educational and collection activites. The underlying as-
sumptions are mainly based on experience in the United Kingdom (U.K.) that, although ex-
ceptionally well documented, is not necessarily represenative of experiences in other coun-
tries. Administrative (and compliance) costs in the U.K. are high on account of inadvisable
design features of the VAT such as the zero rate on so-called essentials, and due to a mis-
placed organizational framework, such as the lack of integration with the business income
tax for control and audit purposes. In studying the VAT, the U.S. should probably take its
example from countries such as Germany and Sweden.
Sijbren Cnossen, Administrative and Compliance Costs of VAT: A Review of the Evidence, 63 TAx
NOTES 1609 (Jun. 20, 1994).
46. Cnossen, supra note 12, at 154.
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viewed from the standpoint of its domestic operation alone, could have
such negative effects on incoming foreign investment flows as to make
the effects of the tax system bad on the whole, i.e., whether tax effects on
foreign investment elasticity could dominate other effects of tax policy on
welfare. Their efforts appear to show that the effects of taxes on foreign
investment could overwhelm the effects of taxes on domestic welfare,
holding foreign investment constant (or assuming no foreign invest-
ment).47 Models thus appear to prove that tax competition can turn an
otherwise "good" tax system into a "bad" one.
In order to determine whether that transformation might occur in the
real world, much more must be known about actual foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) response to taxes. You might think that in a world as well
documented as ours has become, this information would be easy to gath-
er; but it is elusive. One reason is that much of the best data about for-
eign investment flows is collected by governmental agencies like the
Department of Commerce without regard to whether foreign ventures in
this country use funds brought in from abroad or instead borrow locally.
Balance-of-payment figures do not distinguish local borrowing and hence
may be deceptive, yet they are virtually all we have. Scholars have dis-
puted the need for, and indeed the very possibility of, making allowance
for this aspect of the balance of payment data.48 The upshot is that we
have little reliable information about the actual effect of recent tax law on
FDI. A second problem about measuring the effect of taxes on FDI is that
empirical research has generally ignored the effect of taxes in the home
country of the foreign investor. One investigation concludes that the evi-
dence supports the conclusion either that U.S. taxation of FDI had a nega-
tive effect on such investment or that stagnation of the foreign investor's
home country economy had a controlling influence on the amount of FDI
in the United States. The same study concludes that FDI is not measur-
ably affected by the severity of home country taxation or tax relief for
foreign-source income.49
47. See Lawrence H. Goulder et al., Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector, in BEHAVIOR-
AL SIMULATION METHODS IN TAX POLICY ANALYSIS (Martin Feldstein ed., 1983); Lawrence H. Sum-
mers, Tax Policy and International Competitiveness, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER NO. 2007 (1986).
48. Joosung Jun, U.S. Tax Policy and Direct Investment Abroad, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 55 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) (arguing for the need for general correction to
take local borrowing into account); Michael P. Dooley, Comments on Jun's U.S. Tax Policy and
Direct Investment Abroad, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 74-78 (Assaf Razin & Joel
Slemrod eds., 1990) (disputing the significance of local borrowing by foreign concerns).
49. Joel Slemrod, Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Evidence From
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Analysis of the effects of interactive tax systems is just beginning. 0
Nevertheless, the urge to harmonize is strongly felt and has the general
support of theorists and others who influence tax legislation. The heat of
accelerating economic integration does not afford us the luxury of waiting
until theory catches up. Given the sense of urgency conveyed by a chang-
ing and exotic world capital market, the experience and experiments of
the European Union are dazzling to contemporary tax policy makers.
VI. FREE TRADE AND TAx HARMONIZATION - THE CASE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union is of course the most sophisticated of trade
agreements. The goal of removing barriers to the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital defined the early European Economic
Community, nominal forerunner of today's European Union." Recent
steps towards the completion of the internal European market have openly
strengthened the political dimension of what started as a purely economic
union of sovereign European states.52 Closely parallel to this political
development has been a deepening of the effort of EU tax policy makers
to achieve tax coordination among the member states.
Efforts to unify the tax principles of EU countries have fallen into
two categories, whose significance is based in part on the Union's orga-
nizing instruments. Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty calls for "the establish-
ment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the
Common Market" and article 3(h) mandates "the approximation of the
laws of the Members States to the extent required for the proper function-
ing of the Common Market."53 Since discordant tax laws were among
the more obvious causes of distortion that afflicted the member states
when the Treaty was first ratified, it might have seemed obvious that the
Treaty contemplated broad efforts towards the elimination of idiosyncra-
cies in the member states' tax systems. But the Treaty expressly provided
a Cross-Country Comparison, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 79 (Assaf Razin & Joel
Slemrod eds., 1990) (disputing the significance of local borrowing by foreign concerns).
50. See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy, AM.
ECON. REV. 1086 (1986).
51. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community obligates the EC Member
States to abolish barriers progressively to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY].
52. Peter Jenkins, There Really Is No Alternative, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 24, 1990, at 21, col. 6
("[Tihe great dream of the founding fathers of the original European communities [was] a United
States of Europe.").
53. See EEC TREATY (as amended 1987).
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only for the harmonization of indirect taxes,' alluding to direct taxation
obliquely at best in a provision that exhorted the members to strive to-
wards the reduction of double taxation."5
Harmonization of indirect taxes within the EU has been most dra-
matically achieved in the replacement of turnover taxes by a common
system of value-added taxation. 6 Although the member states devised
their own VAT regimes and the results differ significantly from state to
state, the overall pattern is remarkably strong. Since January 1, 1993, the
EU countries have had a standard minimum VAT rate of fifteen percent,
with reduced rates of no less than five percent on specified categories of
goods and services. 7 It might be argued that the rate disparities among
state sales taxes in the United States have not produced substantial eco-
nomic distortion and that this EU accomplishment is possibly not so
important after all. But the comparatively high rate of the European VAT,
roughly twice that of the highest state sales taxes, is significant in itself.
By adopting such a high indirect tax, each of the EU member states has
effectively curtailed its ability to increase direct tax burdens without risk-
ing a strong reaction from its voting public. The European VAT harmoni-
zation is therefore a double measure - a unification of an important part
of the member states' indirect tax systems and a focal point of pressure
upon the institution of direct taxation.
Direct taxation was not ignored, however, during the early years of
the European Community. In 1960, the EC Commission appointed a fiscal
and financial committee to study the detrimental effect of discordant
national systems of direct taxation on the goal of an integrated Communi-
ty-wide market. The committee reported in 1962 that such inharmonious
direct taxation could seriously distort the internal market and recommend-
ed that all forms of taxes, except individual income taxes, be centrally
regulated. In 1967, the EC Commission submitted to the EC Council a
proposal to harmonize corporation income taxes." In response, the com-
mission published a pre-draft for a European convention to eliminate
54. EEC TREATY art. 99 (as amended 1987).
5555. EEC TREATY arn. 220 (as amended 1987).
56. See Council Directive 67/227, 1967 O.J. (L 71) 1301 (requiring member states to adopt VAT
legislation).
57. Jan E. Brinkmann & Andreas 0. Riecker, European Community Taration: The Ruding Com-
mittee Report Gives Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus, 27 INT'L LAW. 1061, 1063 n.6 (1993).
58. Commission Proposal for Harmonization of Corporate Income Tax, 1967 BULL. EUR. COM-
MUNmES, EOC 104, Supp. No. 8 (June 26, 1967).
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double taxation, and in 1969 two draft directives59 on company taxation
were published.' These directives were ultimately enacted in 1990,
bringing to a head the previously stalled efforts of the Community to do
something to coordinate members states' corporate tax regimes.61 Anoth-
er important step towards EU coordination of direct taxation also occurred
in 1990, with the ratification of a multilateral convention among the EU
member states requiring arbitration for transfer pricing disputes.62
What now complicates the movement towards unification of tax
principles within the EU is the politically sensitive adoption of the pro-
cedural principle that community-oriented legal reforms should take place
at the lowest level of centralization within the EU - the so-called
"subsidiarity" principle. The Council of the European Community has
interpreted this principle as requiring that its tax coordination efforts
should take the form of "directives" rather than "regulations." Directives
require member states to take action themselves to revise their laws to
comply with a specified EU objective. Regulations, by contrast, are im-
mediately binding upon the member states. Hence, the Council has issued
only general orders - directives - concerning tax coordination, and has
59. Draft-directives are proposed EC directives, submitted by the EC Commission to the member
states, for future adoption by the EC Council.
60. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of Taxation Applica-
ble to Parent Companies and Their Subsidiaries of Different Member States, 1969 J.O. (C 039) 7
(relating to dividends flowing between parent and subsidiary companies of member states); Commis-
sion Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Di-
visions, and Contributions of Assets Involving Companies of Different Member States, 1969 J.O. (C
039) 1 (relating to mergers and reorganizations).
61. See David C. Donald, Taxation For a Single Market: European Community Legislation on
Mergers, Distributed Profits, and Intracompany Sales, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37 (1991); Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, Recent Developments in Corporate Taxation in the European Communities en
Route to the Establishment of the Internal Market, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47 (1992).
The reason for the long delay was the tension within the Community between adherents of the classi-
cal corporate tax and adherents of corporate tax integration. The classical corporate tax is one levied
on the company as a separate taxpayer from its shareholders or otherwise designated owners, and
allowing no deduction from the corporate tax base for dividends paid out; thus corporate earnings are
taxed twice, if they are distributed to shareholders. The United States and the Netherlands are perhaps
the principal countries that still follow the classical model. An EC Commission headed by A.J. van
den Tempel reported in 1970 concerning the variety of company tax schemes then in force within the
Community and expressed a preference for the classical model. A.J. van den Tempel, Corporation
Tax and Individual Income Tax in the European Communities (Studies: Competition-Approximation
of Legislation Series, No. 15, Brussels 1970).
62. Convention 90/436/EEC on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10. An EC Convention is an
agreement between the EC Member States; unlike a directive, which is binding when issued by the
EC Council, no EC Member State is bound by a convention that has been proposed by the Council
until the national parliament of that Member State has ratified the convention.
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thus left it to the sovereign taxing authorities that make up the Communi-
ty to devise their individual versions of any required coordinated legisla-
tion. Given the complexity of most tax systems, this approach surely
represents as much a concession to potential political intransigence as it
does a recognition of the administrative differences among national tax
systems.
Where does European tax harmonization stand at the moment? The
EU, in typically circumspect fashion, has chosen to ask non-governmental
experts, who are nevertheless strongly identified with the tax policy posi-
tions of their native lands, to assess the situation. The result has been the
1992 report of a Committee of Independent Tax Experts, called the
Ruding Committee after its chairperson, Onno Ruding, former Finance
Minister of the Netherlands.6" The core of the report is its analysis of the
economic distortions affecting investment decisions and competition that
flow from the member states' substantially uncoordinated systems of
direct taxation. The report concludes that the distortion in question is
substantial and is not likely to be eliminated through the interplay of
market forces and tax competition among member states. The report
offered a blueprint for reform based largely on a recommended communi-
ty-wide shift towards company tax integration (elimination of the double
tax on distributed corporate earnings). The recommendations included in
the blueprint would be implemented in three phases: one to be complete
by 1995; a second to correspond to the second phase of the economic and
monetary union set forth in other directives; and a final phase to be si-
multaneous with full economic and monetary union. A central "concrete"
recommendation of the unanimous Committee was the establishment of a
minimum corporate income tax of thirty percent and a maximum of forty
percent in all member states. Nevertheless, the Committee did not unani-
mously agree to propose a common system of company taxation. Instead,
while a majority of the committee favored Professor Albert J. RAdler's
proposal according to which the tax paid by a corporation would be im-
puted to the shareholder receiving a distribution from the corporation
(shareholder relief), one member dissented on the grounds that the goal of
complete tax harmonization was not an appropriate one for the Committee
to consider at the time.'
63. Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts
on Company Taxation (Ruding Committee Report), 92 TAX NOTES INT'L 36-15 (1992); Maarten J.
Ellis, Direct Taxation in the European Community: An Irresistible Force Meets an Immovable Ob-
ject?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51 (1993).
64. As one summary put it:
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In particular, a majority of the Committee favored Professor Radler's
proposal that a tax of at least 30% on interest income received by an EC
creditor of a corporation in another EC member state should be withheld,
in order to level the tax burden on investors' receipts from corporations,
whether the form of the investment be denominated as debt or as equity.
The conception of tax coordination implicit in the Professor Radler's
minority annex to the Ruding Report is obviously one that could be im-
plemented more broadly than within the EU. That such a coordinating
effort is politically daunting even for the EU, however, underscores the
challenge of achieving anything comparable in weaker trade alliances.
Some of the reasons are political; others are perhaps more a reflection of
the mechanical problems raised by the goal of tax coordination.
VII. CONCLUSION
What Europe has achieved by conscious design and what the United
States and its North American neighbors have achieved by accident are
tantalizing variants on the goal of shared sovereignty. The European
Union now provides the astonishing example of many highly developed
countries, the inventors of national sovereignty, who are willing to listen
to nongovernmental experts for advice on the creation of shared con-
straints for the achievement of tax neutrality. State tax systems within the
United States are only now beginning to acknowledge the need for similar
coordination. The future will certainly continue to undermine the assump-
tions of economic isolation and independence that lie at the foundation of
Although a majority of the committee favored an EC corporate tax system of shareholder
relief proposed by one of its members (and presented in an appendix to the report), unani-
mous agreement with respect to an ideal corporate tax system was not achieved. Neverthe-
less, the committee concludes that "the adoption by all member states of a common system
is a desirable long-run objective." Accordingly, it is recommended that the commission and
member states examine in the course of phase I alternative approaches to determine the
most appropriate common corporation tax system to be adopted in phase 3.
Conceding that it would be difficult to achieve a consensus among member states
regarding which system to adopt in the short term, the committee proposes that member
states that apply imputation taxes on the distribution of profits earned in another member
state should allow, on a reciprocal basis, such tax to be reduced by corporate income tax
paid in the other member state in respect to dividends remitted by a subsidiary, or profits
earned by a permanent establishment (phase 1).
For a more detailed account, see Albert J. Rhidler, Einheitlicher europaischer Kapitalmarkt und
Besteuerung, in FESTSCHRIIr FOR KARL BENSCH 675 (Heinrich Beisse et al. eds., 1993).
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existing systems of direct and indirect taxation, apart from those pio-
neered, as the VAT has been, to assure multi-jurisdictional neutrality.

